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Abstract The emergence of synthetic biology holds the potential of a major
breakthrough in the life sciences by transforming biology into a predictive science.
The dual-use characteristics of similar breakthroughs during the twentieth century
have led to the application of benignly intended research in e.g. virology, bacteri-
ology and aerobiology in offensive biological weapons programmes. Against this
background the article raises the question whether the precautionary governance of
synthetic biology can aid in preventing this techno-science witnessing the same
fate? In order to address this question, this paper proceeds in four steps: it firstly
introduces the emerging techno-science of synthetic biology and presents some of
its potential beneficial applications. It secondly analyses contributions to the bio-
ethical discourse on synthetic biology as well as precautionary reasoning and its
application to life science research in general and synthetic biology more specifi-
cally. The paper then identifies manifestations of a moderate precautionary principle
in the emerging synthetic biology dual-use governance discourse. Using a dual-use
governance matrix as heuristic device to analyse some of the proposed measures, it
concludes that the identified measures can best be described as ‘‘patchwork pre-
caution’’ and that a more systematic approach to construct a web of dual-use pre-
caution for synthetic biology is needed in order to guard more effectively against the
field’s future misuse for harmful applications.
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Introduction
Over the past decade synthetic biology has emerged as one of the most dynamic
sub-fields of the life sciences. Like most other areas of life science research, such as
neurobiology (Royal Society 2012), or converging science and technology, such as
nanotechnology (Kosal 2009), synthetic biology has a dual-use potential, i.e. its
advances can be used for beneficial purposes as well as for harmful ones.1 History
teaches that the dual-use potential of major breakthroughs in the life sciences during
the twentieth century that were benignly intended, such as in virology, bacteriology
and aerobiology, have been applied in offensive biological weapons (BW)
programmes (Dando 1999). This pattern of past state practice as well as the more
recent concerns about sub-state actors, i.e. terrorist groups, using biological
weapons raises the question whether synthetic biology—that could potentially
transform biology into a predictive science—is destined to witness the same fate?
Over recent years the label ‘synthetic biology’ has been attached to a number of
diverse research and development activities, ranging from the development of
‘biobricks’ to the search for a minimal cell to the delivery of customized genes by
DNA synthesis companies. With a view to the categorical difference between
‘standard’ and synthetic biology, the US Presidential Commission for the Study of
Bioethical Issues has pointed out that:
‘Whereas standard biology treats the structure and chemistry of living things
as natural phenomena to be understood and explained, synthetic biology treats
biochemical processes, molecules and structures as raw materials and tools to
be used in novel and potentially useful ways, often quite independent of their
natural roles.’ (Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues
2010: 36; emphasis in original)
The ability to understand, modify, and ultimately create new life forms at the
molecular level clearly would represent a scientific paradigm shift with a substantial
misuse potential. In general terms, synthetic biology can be misused to engineer
biological parts or modules that either increase the efficiency/stability/usability of
known biological warfare agents or to synthesize new ones. While currently there
are still formidable challenges to overcome e.g. in the creation of synthetic
pathogens (Epstein 2008), there is a general acknowledgement that these hurdles
will be lowered by scientific and technological advances over the next few years. In
the words of a report jointly published by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the J Craig
Venter Institute, ‘[i]n the near future, however, the risk of nefarious use will rise
because of the increasing speed and capability of the technology and its widening
accessibility’ (Garfinkel et al. 2007). What is often overlooked in discussions of the
‘‘risk’’ of synthetic biology’s dual-use potential being actually misused is the fact
that in a strict sense we are no longer dealing with risk. Even though Garfinkel et al.
are correct in pointing out that the technological hurdles for misuse will decrease




over time, the probability of misuse still remains unknown. We are thus dealing with
uncertainty, not risk. In addition, determining the malicious effects to which
benignly intended synthetic biology advances might be put is problematic,
especially if one tries to establish unanticipated consequences of novel biological
agents that could be created. Thus, one is dealing with ignorance, not risk (Stirling
2007). It follows that traditional methods of risk assessment are of limited utility in
the formulation of dual-use governance measures. Hence, the focus in this article on
such proposals and measures that are informed by some form of precautionary
reasoning.
Drawing on an increasing body of scholarly work on synthetic biology but also
on the governance of this new techno-science from the perspectives of bio-safety,
bio-security and bio-ethics, this paper will first provide a brief overview of the
emerging field of synthetic biology. This will be followed by a discussion of
bioethical and precautionary approaches to life science research in general and
synthetic biology in particular. Utilising a dual-use governance matrix as a heuristic
device, the final section of the paper will start mapping out governance proposals
that follow precautionary reasoning and include an illustrative set of dual-use
governance measures that have been proposed or are being pursued by a range of
different stakeholders. These are ranging from awareness-raising on the level of
individual scientists, to codes of conduct and guidelines, to regulation at the national
and international levels. Based on this survey of the field, the paper concludes that
the identified patchwork of precautionary measures will need to be systematised and
put on a sustainable basis in order to raise the hurdles for the field’s future misuse in
harmful applications.
The Emergence of Synthetic Biology as a New Techno-Science
Defining the Field of Synthetic Biology
As Luis Campos (2009) has shown, scientists’ attempts to redesign life have
manifested themselves in a number of different approaches throughout the twentieth
century. There also seems to be widespread agreement that the term ‘‘synthetic
biology’’ entered the scientific vocabulary in 1912 with the publication of the
French chemist Stephane Leduc’s monograph entitled La biologie synthe´tique
(de Lorenzo and Danchin 2008). Yet, synthetic biology in its current incarnation
was initially not destined to carry this label. Instead terms such as ‘open source
biology’ and ‘intentional biology’ were proposed for the renewed attempt by some
to convert biology into a predictive science by incorporating elements of the
engineering design cycle. As one early proponent of such a redirection stated,
‘[w]hen we can successfully predict the behaviour of designed biological systems,
then an intentional biology will exist. With an explicit engineering component,
intentional biology is the opposite of the current, very nearly random applications of
biology as technology.’ (Carlson 2001) Besides the Molecular Sciences Institute of
the University of California at Berkeley at which Rob Carlson was envisaging a
distributed open source biological manufacturing system driving future industry,
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another early institutional hub of contemporary synthetic biology was located at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) where Tom Knight started developing
the Biobricks standard for biological parts (Knight 2002).
Not surprisingly for a scientific discipline in its formative phase, several
competing definitions exist for synthetic biology. One that has received much
attention describes synthetic biology as ‘the design and construction of new
biological parts, devices, and systems, and the re-design of existing, natural
biological systems for useful purposes’.2 This definition clearly reflects the
approach to synthetic biology pioneered by scientists at the MIT and emphasizes
the concept of standardized biological parts that can be assembled into devices and
systems with predefined and predictable functions. Although the MIT framing of the
issue area and its support for key activities has been instrumental in triggering the
development of the whole field, an exclusive focus on the parts-based approach to
synthetic biology tends to overlook other important sub-fields in synthetic biology.
Although they cannot all be discussed in detail in this paper, for ease of reference,
four different sub-strands of synthetic biology are distinguished here3:
• Engineering DNA based biological circuits, by using standardized biological
parts;
• Identifying the minimal genome;
• Constructing protocells, in other words living cells from base chemicals; and
• Creating orthogonal biological systems in the laboratory through chemical
synthetic biology.
These four strands are supplemented by two enabling technologies that often are
also subsumed under the heading of synthetic biology, although they have a more
supportive role to the main strands of the field. This applies first and foremost to the
increasingly more affordable large-scale DNA synthesis capabilities that a small
number of companies are providing,4 but also to the more generic bioinformatics
capabilities utilized by those attempting to identify a minimal genome, to model
protocells or to apply engineering principles to biology in a more generic sense.
Synthetic biology therefore has to be understood as a key piece in the puzzle of
converging science and technology that aims at fusing molecular biology with
engineering, by designing and producing new biological parts, devices and systems.
To achieve this goal, synthetic biology utilizes high throughput commercial DNA
synthesis capabilities to provide the actual biological material for the assembly of
genetic circuits. In addition, synthetic biology is relying on increasingly powerful
information technology tools that allow for the modelling of certain desired
biological functions. A report by the Royal Academy of Engineering (Royal
Academy of Engineering (RAE) 2009a) in the UK has described in detail the design
cycle that informs the engineering approach to synthetic biology. Standardized bio-
2 See: http://syntheticbiology.org/Who_we_are.html accessed at November 6 2008.
3 This sub-division follows Schmidt (2009); other typologies have been proposed inter alia by O’Malley
et al. (2007) and Deplazes (2009).




parts that have undergone appropriate quality controls can then in turn be utilized to
build standard devices, which, in turn, can be assembled into more complex
biological systems.
Several drivers account for the rapid exponential development of the field of
synthetic biology over the past few years. These range from dedicated funding
initiatives mostly in the US and Europe with the US outspending Europe almost 3 to
1 (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 2010) to the annual
International Genetically Engineered Machines (iGEM) competitions5 as well as the
five SBx.0 conferences. While three of these conferences were held in the USA
(Cambridge, Berkeley and Stanford), SB3.0 took place in Zurich, Switzerland, in
2007 and SB4.0 in Hong Kong in 2008. With SB6.0 taking place in London in
summer 2013 the SBx.0 conference series will return back to Europe. Over the
course of these international SB-conferences but also national initiatives, such as the
UK BBSRC-funded networks in synthetic biology, it has become obvious that
synthetic biology encompasses more than only the engineering-inspired parts based
approach emphasised here. In this sense some relabeling of more traditional
biotechnology and molecular biology approaches can be observed in order to
participate in a newly established, ‘cool’ and potentially well-funded discipline. The
foundation for the rapid development of synthetic biology was provided by early
optimistic assessments of the potential benefits that could be derived from synthetic
biology applications.
Beneficial Uses of Synthetic Biology
One such assessments of synthetic biology’s potential was provided in a 2005 report
by an EU high-level expert group, which forecast it to ‘drive industry, research,
education and employment in the life sciences in a way that might rival the
computer industry’s development during the 1970s to the 1990s.’ (EU 2005) This
group of experts envisaged synthetic biology to have such a profound effect by ‘re-
organizing biotechnological development’ in a way so that ‘research & development
are likely to proceed in a much faster and much more organized way.’ (EU 2005:
13) The report identifies six areas that would benefit from such a streamlining of
R&D processes: biomedicine, synthesis of biopharmaceuticals, sustainable chemical
industry, environment and energy, production of smart materials and biomaterials
and counter-bioterrorism measures (EU 2005: 13–17).
The most high-profile example for the imminent breakthrough of a ground
breaking synthetic biology application is related to the insertion of an engineered
metabolic pathway into a yeast strain to produce artemisinic acid (Ro et al. 2006).
This in turn can be converted into artemisinin, which forms the basis of anti-
malarial drugs. The key goal of the attempt to synthesize this artemisinin precursor
is to reduce production cost for the therapeutic and thus increase its availability in
developing regions of the world. As Chang and Keasling have pointed out in
5 Starting out with a handful of mostly undergraduate student teams from US universities in 2004, the
2010 international genetically engineered machines (iGEM) competition has attracted 130 teams from
about 20 countries. See http://ung.igem.org/Previous_iGEM_Competitions.
Beyond Patchwork Precaution 1125
123
relation to ‘this approach, the genes related to the biosynthetic pathway for a target
natural product are transplanted from the natural host into a genetically tractable
host system such as E. coli or S. cerevisiae.’ (Chang and Keasling 2006: 1)
Similarly, synthetic biologists have made some progress in utilising genetically
modified microbes to produce biofuels (Azumi, Hanai and Liao 2008; Keasling and
Chou 2008). However, despite being regularly quoted as the most relevant synthetic
biology development, it has to be pointed out that the research and development
conducted by Keasling and his team are ‘light-years’ away from the ideal case of a
fully modularised process built on standardised bio-parts. Rather, as Keasling
himself has acknowledged, his research involves extremely labour intensive trial-
and error processes that have consumed in excess of ‘150 person-years of work
including uncovering genes involved in the pathway and developing or refining
parts to control their expression’ with the corresponding vast amounts of funding
such a process requires (Kwok 2010: 289).
Dual-Use Bioethics and Precautionary Approaches to Risk and Uncertainty
in the Life Sciences
Bioethical Discussion of Synthetic Biology and its Implications
One of the earliest ethical commentaries on synthetic biology was published already
in 1999 in Science and has been regularly quoted by practitioners in the field and
academics alike. It acknowledged that in order to
‘ensure responsible use of knowledge that could be applied to the construction
of biological weapons, we need to give serious thought to monitoring and
regulation at the level of national and international public policy.’ (Cho et al.
1999: 2089)
Yet, as Yearley has concluded a decade later, while Cho and her colleagues
‘highlight things that people may have ethical concerns about, the paper does not set
out or determine what the ethical analysis might conclude.’ (Yearley 2009: 3) More
fundamentally, Yearley’s review of bioethics as a template to conduct an ethical
review of synthetic biology leads him to caution that such an approach might
actually be ‘counterproductive since the apparatus constructed to conduct the social
and ethical review will come to look like a mere legitimatory cloak for synthetic
biology’s advance.’ (Yearley 2009: 6) Yet, Yearley remains somewhat elusive in
specifying what else might serve as a suitable foundation for an ethical review of
synthetic biology, either in general terms or with specific reference to the dual-use
aspects of the emerging field.
Miller and Selgelid (2007), in contrast, provide a much more detailed and in
depth ‘ethical and philosophical consideration’ of dual-use issues in the life
sciences. Although not specifically targeting synthetic biology, their analysis
illuminates many aspects of bioethical reasoning that are of relevance to synthetic
biology too. Based on ‘a particularly morally problematic species of the dual-use
dilemma’ (Miller and Selgelid 2007:531), in the form of a number of experiments of
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concern, they discuss the permissibility of certain kinds of research, debate
dissemination of dual-use research results, and analyse different ethically informed
governance models with which to tackle the dual-use issues presented by the
biological sciences. With regard to this latter aspect, Miller and Selgelid discard
both the laissez-faire option of giving the individual scientist complete autonomy
over research with dual-use potential, and the rather draconian option of complete
governmental control. Instead they argue for either a mixed system of institutional
and governmental controls or a governance approach that would rely on an
independent authority being set up (Miller and Selgelid 2007: 573). Thus, while
providing a detailed discussion of ethical issues in relation to dual-use life sciences
research, and a narrowing down of – in their view – suitable governance options, the
analysis remains in this latter dimension somewhat inconclusive.
In contrast to Miller and Selgelid, Ehni’s (2008) discussion of the ethical
responsibilities of scientists engaged in dual-use research is more limited in scope.
He approaches the issue by discussing the ‘basic conflict between the freedom of
science and the duty to avoid causing harm’ from two perspectives, that of ‘moral
skepticism and the ethics of responsibility by Hans Jonas’ (Ehni 2008: 147). On this
basis Ehni analyses four basic duties to be considered, ranging from ‘stopping
research in some cases’ to not publishing results and descriptions of research results
and possible dual-use applications.’ (Ehni 2008: 151) Given the nature of the dual-
use issues at hand and the way science is organised, Ehni concludes along the lines
of Miller and Selgelid that ‘[i]t is no solution to the ‘dual-use’ problem to transfer
total responsibility to individuals’(Ehni 2008: 151). Instead he advocates a ‘mixed
authority’ for the governance of dual-use issues, the details of which he also leaves
unspecified.
While the recommendation of not assigning sole responsibility to individual
scientists is shared by Kuhlau et al. (2008), they point out that the moral duty to
prevent harm on the part of an individual researcher does exist and includes both
intentional and unintentional harm. Furthermore, such moral duty linked to the
professional role of the researcher carries with it a requirement for an ‘awareness of
relevant regulation and potential dangers’ (Kuhlau et al. 2008: 481). This awareness
in turn, ‘entails a continuous process of reviewing one’s work in a wider context.’
Based on this reasoning they identify five criteria for the obligation to prevent harm.
‘In order to take social responsibility and due care, life scientists should strive
to prevent harm that is: Within their professional responsibility… Within their
professional capacity and ability… Reasonably foreseeable… Proportionally
greater than the benefits… [and] Not more easily achieved by other means…’
(Kuhlau et al. 2008: 481f.)
These criteria are subsequently applied by Kuhlau et al. to a number of proposed
obligations for life scientists in relation to dual use issues. They conclude that
scientific responsibility ‘does not involve preventing the act of misuse but rather
involves obligations concerned with preventing foreseeable and highly probable
harm.’ [Idem: 487, emphasis in original] Such reasonable obligations include in
their view the duties to consider negative research implications, to protect sensitive
material, technology and knowledge from unauthorised access, and to report
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suspicious activities. While this again represents a useful clarification of the
obligation of life scientists including synthetic biologists in relation to dual-use
issues they face in their work, it leaves both the institutional and wider governance
contexts unexplored within which these duties need to be considered.
The European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the
European Commission (EGE) in its Opinion No 25 on the ‘Ethics of synthetic
biology’ usefully points out in this respect that:
‘Governance is an overarching concept including legal, political and ethical
considerations. Since synthetic biology may result in major changes of
traditional biology, governance needs to be reflected on all these levels, finally
entering the legal sphere.’ (EGE 2009: 36)
With respect to ethical consideration of synthetic biology, the EGE distinguishes
between conceptual and specific issues, and addresses both biosafety and
biosecurity under the latter heading (Ibid: 42–44). In its discussion of potential
steps to be taken the EGE recommends that:
‘ethical issues that arise because of the potential for dual use should be
dealt with at the educational level. Fostering individual and institutional
responsibility through ethics discussion on synthetic biology is a key issue.’
(Ibid: 52)
In addition, the EGE opinion contains three formal recommendations, (1) linking
dual-use bio-ethics to the BWC by recommending that this international treaty
‘should incorporate provisions on the limitation or prohibition of research in
synthetic biology’, (2) requesting the European Commission to define a ‘compre-
hensive security and ethics framework for synthetic biology’, and (3) requesting the
establishment of DNA sequence databases with supporting, legally based rules and
procedures. (Idem).
A similarly wide-ranging attempt to chart the ethical issues surrounding synthetic
biology has been undertaken by the US Presidential Commission for the Study of
Bioethical Issues (PCSBI), which in December 2010 produced its first report
entitled New Directions: The Ethics of Synthetic Biology and Emerging Technol-
ogies (PCSBI, 2010). Guided by general ethical principles, the report arrives at 18
recommendations, some of which are either informed by the dual use character of
synthetic biology or seek to address its implications. Of particular relevance in this
context are recommendations 12 and 13. Acknowledging the dynamic character of
the field and the resulting changes in dual use issues of relevance the Committee
recommends periodic assessments of safety and security risks to be undertaken. It
recommends that ‘[a]n initial review should be completed within 18 months and the
results made public to the extent permitted by law.’ (Ibid: 13) Should this review
identify ‘significant unmanaged security or safety concerns’, recommendation 13
foresees changes to existing oversight and control mechanisms with a view to
‘making compliance with certain oversight or reporting measures mandatory for all
researchers … regardless of funding sources.’ (Ibid: 14) This last point would lead
to a significant tightening of existing oversight mechanisms as it would expand their
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reach beyond publicly funded life science research and oblige commercial research
activities to abide by the same regulatory framework.
The Precautionary Principle and its Application to Dual-Use Life Sciences
Research
Emergence of the precautionary principle (PP) is usually traced back to the growing
salience of environmental concerns during the 1970s. Since then the PP has been
proposed as guidance for action in a variety of contexts and a substantial number of
different formulations. Among the most cited versions of the PP are Principle 15 of
the 1992 Rio Declaration, according to which ‘[w]here there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’ and the
1998 Wingspread statement. It states that:
‘When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment,
precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect
relationships are not fully established scientifically.’6
However, the PP has been far from uncontroversial. Parke and Bedau (2009) for
example discuss eleven criticisms that have been brought forward against the PP in
its various forms. Yet, despite these criticisms there have been an increasing number
of calls to utilise the PP either as a conceptual tool or in a more pragmatic manner
(Stirling 2007, Arcuri 2007). As an example of the latter category Kuhlau et al.
(2011) mention the World Medical Association’s 2002 declaration on biological
weapons, according to which ‘[a]ll who participate in biomedical research have a
moral and ethical obligation to consider the implications of possible malicious use
of their findings.’ (Kuhlau et al. 2011: 3) In conceptual terms Arcuri usefully
introduces a spectrum of versions of the PP, the two extremes of which are ‘absence
of precaution; and Radical Precaution, that is, to ban any activity that exposes
society to uncertain risks irrespective of their potential consequences.’ She also
maintains that ‘the positions of most scholars and most of the endorsements of the
principle in legal texts are not to be associated with such extremes.’ (Arcuri 2007:
361) In her attempt to further specify this middle ground of precautionary reasoning
Arcuri distinguishes between the conditions under which the PP should be applied
as well as its substantive and procedural components. As to the element of
applicability she proposes to limit the PP to cases involving ‘unmeasurable
uncertainty’ and/or ambiguity and ignorance and summarizes that
‘[o]n top of uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance, most agree that the
precautionary principle is to be applied when potential negative outcomes are
deemed serious and irreversible.’ (Arcuri 2007: 362; emphasis in original)
Paraphrasing her substantive criteria of the PP for the dual-use aspects of synthetic
biology, application of the principle should err on the side of preventing misuse. In
6 This can be found reproduced in numerous places on the web; see e.g. the Science & Environmental
Health Network webpage at http://www.sehn.org/state.html#w, last accessed 8 March 2011.
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relation to the procedural element of the PP Arcuri emphasises that application of
the PP is not a one-off event, and that it is important to consider expert opinion
without delegating the decisions to experts, but instead to allow for democratic
processes to work themselves out. She therefore concludes that
‘the procedural dimension of the principle should favor decision-making
processes that are iterative and informative over time and that integrate
experts’ assessments of the risks to be governed and people’s preferences and
values.’ (Ibid: 364)
Much like Arcuri, Kuhlau and colleagues in their discussion of the PP in relation to
dual-use life sciences research also assume ‘different degrees of precaution’ to be
applicable in different circumstances (Kuhlau et al. 2011: 8). In general terms, and
after having addressed what they regard as the most serious criticisms of the
principle, they conclude that the PP is applicable to dual-use life science research
and propose the following version of the principle for this particular issue area:
‘When and where serious and credible concern exists that legitimately
intended biological material, technology or knowledge in the life sciences
pose threats of harm to human health and security, the scientific community is
obliged to develop, implement and adhere to precautious measures to meet the
concern.’ (Idem)
Although this formulation represents a great step forward in arriving at a
conceptually sound and at the same time practicable version of the PP for dual-
use life science research in general and synthetic biology in particular, it clearly has
a few limitations that will need addressing. Although Kuhlau et al. are emphasising
the need for flexibility in the PP, it would seem advisable to be more specific in
relation to how and by whom it is established that a ‘serious and credible threat’
exists. Likewise, it could easily appear that they suggest leaving the formulation and
implementation of precautious measures exclusively to the scientific community. It
would thus seem that the PP put forward by Kuhlau et al. could be usefully
expanded by the process element proposed by Arcuri that emphasises repeated
engagement and democratic deliberation. It is also worth recalling in this context the
above mentioned EGE opinion on synthetic biology and its recognition of ethical,
political and legal elements all being of relevance for the governance of the issue
area.
Elements of Precaution in the Emerging Synthetic Biology Dual-Use
Governance Discourse
Developing a Dual-Use Governance Matrix for Synthetic Biology
Although the main focus of synthetic biologists is on the design and engineering
aspects of this new field of scientific inquiry, some also emphasize the field’s
contribution to ‘achieving a better understanding of life processes’. (TESSY 2008: 1)
Clearly, this better understanding is sought in order to improve the human condition
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via improved diagnostics, therapeutics and other beneficial applications. However, as
one study has pointed out, a better understanding of life processes in relation to
regulatory systems in the human body also opens new doors for potential misuse of
biologically active chemical compounds that can target the human nervous, immune
or endocrine systems with a higher degree of specificity (Kelle, Nixdorff and Dando
2006). Given the current state of synthetic biology its misuse potential is still limited
and comparable to traditional biotechnological methods. In principle, however,
synthetic biology has a much more wide-ranging dual-use potential that will come to
fruition once the current problems of standardizing parts and modules has progressed
to a point where these are truly compatible and, in addition, can be inserted in a robust
chassis for application/dissemination. The fact that this stage has not yet been reached
allows for the development and application of precautionary dual-use governance
measures in order to minimise the likelihood of nefarious use and to limit its
consequences should such misuse occur.
Several such measures have been discussed from an early stage of the
development of the field of synthetic biology. However, as will be detailed below,
many of them are quite technical in character and address only one aspect of the
field, i.e. the screening of DNA-synthesis orders and customers. In order to improve
on the proposed measures and to create an overarching framework, a modified
version of the 5P dual-use governance matrix proposed by Kelle (2009) will be used
in the first instance as a heuristic device for the mapping of individual governance
proposals. On the basis of such a mapping exercise it is then possible to analyse the
gaps thus identified as to the necessity of additional governance measures being
developed. The 5P refer to five policy intervention points—expanding on the three
proposed by Garfinkel et al. (2007)—that include the principal investigator (PI), the
project, the premise, the provider and purchaser, and the public. While the PI and
the public are self-explanatory, the remaining three are aggregate categories that
involve different actors and might thus benefit from some further elaboration:
intervening at the project level can take a number of forms ranging from the
decision to fund a particular project (or not) through to the dissemination of research
results at a much later stage. The premise at which research and development
activities take place goes beyond the facility in a physical sense and encompasses
institutional actors such as research institutions in an academic or commercial
environment. Lastly, provider and purchaser of DNA sequences, oligos or
corresponding tools and equipment are singled out as their relationships has
received much attention in governance proposals so far and is amenable to a specific
set of governance measures.
In principle, the dual-use governance measures for synthetic biology range from
awareness raising on part of the involved synthetic biologists to education and
training of current and future generations of SB practitioners (Minehata et al. 2011),
codes of conduct, guidelines, regulation, national laws, and international treaties.
The following table maps these measures against the five policy intervention points.
It should be noted that the goal of constructing this matrix is not to suggest that all
of the resulting fields need to be filled with content. However, utilising the matrix as
a heuristic device will facilitate the identification and discussion of dual-use
governance proposals that have been put forward or measures that are already
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available and being implemented and investigate these for their precautionary
content.
Mapping the Dual-Use Discourse on Synthetic Biology7
One of the earliest proposals to address synthetic biology’s dual-use implications
that was informed by precautionary reasoning was put forward by George Church.
In it he acknowledges that
‘While the likelihood of misuse of oligos to gain access to nearly extinct
human viruses (e.g. polio) or novel pathogens (like IL4-poxvirus) is small, the
consequences loom larger than chemical and nuclear weapons, since
biohazards are inexpensive, can spread rapidly world-wide and evolve on
their own.’ (Church 2004)
In order to address such a low probability-high consequence event, he proposed to
develop a system for both ‘instrument and reagent licensing’, and to screen for
select agents, including a ‘DNA agent clearinghouse’ (Idem). While Church’s
proposal foresaw some form of government involvement or oversight in both these
systems, subsequent proposals placed more emphasis on the self-governance efforts
of the scientific community and commercial DNA-synthesis providers.
Such proposals were put forward and discussed at the SB2.0 conference, which
took place in Berkeley in May 2006 and during which a full day was devoted to
discussion of societal issues related to synthetic biology. The White Paper prepared
by Maurer and colleagues for SB2.0 explicitly recognizes that synthetic biology
research might be misused to do harm when stating that ‘synthetic biologists have
an obligation to make sure that their work does not amplify earlier risks or create
new ones.’ (Maurer, Lucas and Terrell 2006: 2) The subsequently formulated
declaration of the conference contains four resolutions that aim at addressing some
of the dual-use implications of synthetic biology, in particular DNA synthesis that
may give rise to safety or security concerns (Conferees, SB2.0 2006). The focus on
DNA synthesis is also reflected in two of the four resolutions contained in the final
declaration. In terms of practical next steps to be pursued, the declaration announces
the formation of an open working group in support of the improvement of existing
software tools for checking DNA sequences, as well as the completion of a study to
‘develop policy options that might be used to govern DNA synthesis technology’
(Ibid: 3).
This study, which was conducted jointly by the MIT, the J Craig Venter Institute
and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, reinforced the trend to focus
dual-use governance options for synthetic biology on DNA synthesis technology.
The report’s authors identify three policy intervention points: first DNA synthesis
itself, as conducted by gene synthesis firms; second, oligonucleotide manufacturers,
and; third, DNA synthesizers, as the most effective ones for preventing the misuse
of synthetic genomics. For both gene foundries and oligo manufacturers the authors




of the report conclude that a combination of screening orders by companies and the
certification of orders by a biosafety/biosecurity officer provide the greatest benefits
in terms of preventing misuse. The storage of order information by firms was
regarded as the most useful tool for responding after an incident had occurred.
Lastly, concerning equipment such as DNA synthesizers, the report concluded that
the licensing of both equipment and reagents was most likely to enhance biosecurity
by preventing misuse (Garfinkel et al. 2007).
Ideas developed in this report were subsequently taken up in proposals for
precautionary governance measures by the (then existing) two industry associations
in the area of synthetic biology. The first of these groups, the International
Consortium for Polynucleotide Synthesis (ICPS) put forward a ‘tiered DNA
synthesis order screening process.’ (Bu¨gl et al. 2007) Based on their concern that the
‘[m]isuse of DNA-synthesis technology could give rise to both known and
unforeseeable threats to our biological safety and security’ (Ibid: 627), the ICPS
proposal put DNA synthesis companies and their industry association at the centre
of a governance structure that would, however, not be a self-contained system of
oversight, but rather rely on agreed-upon guidelines. Such guidelines would be
operationalized inter alia through lists of ‘select agents or sequences’ that would
determine whether and how to process DNA synthesis orders on the part of those
companies that follow the guidelines.
Members of the Industry Association Synthetic Biology (IASB) have focussed on
a number of interrelated issues that also revolve around the screening of DNA
orders by synthesis companies. These were formulated during an April 2008
workshop on ‘Technical solutions for biosecurity in synthetic biology’ (IASB
2008). Motivated by ‘our responsibility for the scientific field to which we provide
services and products’ (Ibid: 2), workshop participants agreed on the adoption of
five distinct work packages:
1. Harmonization of screening strategies for DNA synthesis orders;
2. Creation of a central virulence factor database;
3. Publication of an article on the status quo of synthetic biology;
4. Establishment of a technical bio-security working group with members from
both organisations in order to ‘‘discuss improvements and next steps for bio-
security measures’’, and;
5. Formulation of a code of conduct. (Ibid: 16)
With this last work package, IASB started to move away from technically
orientated dual-use governance measures into the political arena of setting standards
and promoting best practices.
The focus of proposals described thus far has been on the providers and
purchasers of long-strand DNA synthesis, which are located at the bottleneck of the
key enabling technology for parts and module based synthetic biology. Some
proposals place a higher emphasis on government involvement than others, but all
try to minimize the negative impact governance might have on scientific progress
and economic benefits. These largely technology and supply-side focussed
governance proposals have been supplemented by others, which are also informed
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by precautionary reasoning, but involve different fields of the matrix presented
above. Two such examples shall be briefly discussed here.
The first is synthetic biology specific and related to two studies undertaken by the
Royal Academy of Engineering in the UK on the one hand, and two of the UK’s
research funding councils, on the other.8 Both studies are significant on at least two
levels: first, both of them revolve around a public dialogue on synthetic biology,
thus aim at expanding the discourse on synthetic biology beyond the expert level.
This potentially allows public input into the formulation of governance measures as
identified in Table 1 above. Secondly, although not specifically focussing on dual-
use questions, some limited coverage of biosecurity issues can still be discerned in
the study design. For example agree all participants in the Royal Academy of
Engineering study with the statement that ‘most scientific research can be used for
good or ill’ (RAE 2009b: 42), thus accepting that much of synthetic biology is dual
use in character. An interesting finding from the research councils’ dialogue is
related to questions of controls and regulations for synthetic biology. Although no
consensus could be achieved among participants concerning the level of regulation
or governance measures required, there was a strong opinion emerging that
whatever the regulatory efforts, they needed to be coordinated internationally
(BBSRC/EPSRC 2010: 44). This indicates the importance of the bottom row of
table 1 above.
Another important observation in relation to the two public dialogue exercises is
linked to the process dimension of the precautionary principle emphasised by Arcuri
and speaks to the goal of embedding the precautionary governance of synthetic
biology in some form of iterative, democratically grounded process: although the
BBSRC has convened a follow up meeting to take the findings of the public
dialogue forward, in essence both of these dialogues have been singular events and
there seems to be considerable uncertainty on how to institutionalise public
involvement in the synthetic biology governance discourse. However, this is just














Source adapted from Kelle 2009
8 The two research councils in question are the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research
Council, BBSRC, and the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, EPSRC.
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one manifestation of the more generic problem of how to arrive at iterative
processes in dealing with the dual-use potential of synthetic biology.
A markedly different approach to dual-use governance in the life sciences in
general and with clear applicability to synthetic biology has been taken by a number
of different institutions and initiatives that focus on the dual-use education of life-
scientists in order to raise their awareness of dual-use issues affecting their work and
thus put them in a better position to make informed choices in their research. One
initiative by a UK based group of academics has led to the creation of an online
Educational Module Resource that is freely available for university-level life
science instructors to use in courses on bioethics, biosafety, responsible conduct of
science, or as a stand-alone course (Minehata et al. 2011).
A broader initiative along similar lines has been pursued by a committee of the
US National Research Council in collaboration with other academies and learned
societies. This has resulted in the publication of a report that provides some insight
into the state of dual-use education in the life sciences (NRC 2011). As the report
points out:
‘Available evidence suggests that, to date, there has been very limited
introduction of education about dual use issues, either as stand-alone courses
or as parts of other courses. Furthermore, few of the established courses appear
to incorporate the best practices and lessons learned from research on the
‘‘science of learning.’’’ (Ibid: 4)
Although the report also mentions recent improvements in the overall dual-use
education picture, it is worth remembering that the synthetic biology community
is only partially composed of life scientists, and due to its inter-disciplinary
nature counts large numbers of engineers and bioinformatics scholars with a
grounding in information technology among its ranks. While it may be desirable
to address this issue by reference to generic principles of the responsible conduct
of science, it would appear that this body of scholarly work has so far ignored
dual-use issues.9 Adding to this the DIY-biology component of the synthetic
biology community, it is fair to assume that the educational dimension of the
dual-use governance discourse within the synthetic biology field poses substantial
additional challenges to the one encountered in a pure life science context
(Edwards and Kelle 2012).
Discussion and Conclusion: Continued Patchwork Precaution or Towards
a More Systematic Approach?
This article set out to discuss the emergence and contours of the new techno-science
of synthetic biology with an emphasis on the engineering-orientated parts-based
strand of the field. Like much of the life sciences more broadly, synthetic biology
9 See for example the US National Research Council’s On Being a Scientist for an example of this
literature, where dual-use is not addressed (NRC 1995).
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research has a clear dual-use potential. In parallel to the development of the techno-
science itself, synthetic biology has sparked a number of ethical analyses and
governance proposals with a view to ensure its responsible use and to prevent
misuse. What is remarkable is the sometimes quite stark gap between broader
ethical analyses on the one hand and more practically orientated dual-use
governance proposals for synthetic biology on the other. While some in both
camps try to bridge the gap, e.g. the work by Miller and Selgelid, or the opinion
formulated by the European Group on Ethics, many of these contributions are either
covering the life sciences in general and thus do not take into account the
peculiarities of synthetic biology, or they deal with synthetic biology specifically,
but do focus on more issues than just dual-use.
As the discussion of the precautionary principle has shown, it is indeed possible
to formulate a moderate version of the PP that allows developing both substantive
and procedural criteria for its application and thus move beyond traditional risk
assessments. Research by Kuhlau et al. has shown how a usable baseline
formulation of the principle that is applicable to dual-use life science research
could look like. As has been argued above, this version of the PP for the life
sciences in general and synthetic biology in particular needs further refinement and
the integration of a process dimension.
Discussion of some of the more prominent governance proposals for synthetic
biology has brought to the fore that quite a few of these at least implicitly contain a
precautionary dimension, without this being made explicit or reflected upon
conceptually. However, there clearly is a patchwork emerging of governance
proposals and initiatives that mostly correspond to the ‘provider/purchaser’ column
in the proposed 5P dual-use governance matrix. These efforts plus educational and
public dialogue initiatives could (and should) be integrated into a more systematic
precautionary dual-use governance approach for synthetic biology. In order to make
progress towards this goal, a structured discourse at institutional, national and
international level about the scope, content and processes of such a systematic and
sustainable governance approach will be required.
Such a discourse would need to raise awareness of dual-use issues at the
individual level through educational measures that go beyond traditional bioethics
education, so that synthetic biologists are aware of their responsibility to prevent
harm. Ideally this would first happen at undergraduate level, but as both Arcuri and
Kuhlau et al. have pointed out, should not be a singular event. Thus, the educational
resources that are already available might be usefully complemented by continuous
professional development (CPD) activities for those entering the field of synthetic
biology from a different disciplinary background. In order to achieve an iterative
process of engagement with dual-use issues, such CPD measures should enable and
prompt individual researchers to consider precautionary measures at different stages
of their research from conceptualisation to publication. However, governance
measures aimed at the individual level would need to be embedded into an
institutional culture that values the prevention of misuse and harmful applications
more highly than is currently the case in many research environments. Such a
reorientation would be unlikely to occur on ethical grounds alone, but would in turn
have to be embedded in a political discourse about preventing the misuse of
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synthetic biology for nefarious purposes. The above mentioned reports and public
dialogues conducted by learned societies and national academies might serve as
useful transmission belts for connecting academia with the political world, so that
political declarations, such as for example the one issued by the G8 group of states
at its 2011 Deauville summit, calling for the more wide-spread adoption of dual-use
bio-ethics (G8 2011) can be translated into sustainable governance outcomes.
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